Abstract
Introduction
An access control mechanism provided by or within any software (e.g. operating system, DBMS etc) is the executable module for controlling access to resources under the control of the software. Every access control mechanism provides a structural framework called the access control model for specifying access restrictions for resources. An access control model is based on certain concepts involved in interaction with resources. These concepts can be broadly described as being made up of entities (e.g., subject, object, operations, permission or right, user, role, label, group etc) and relations (the combination of an object and operation defines a permission) that describe the nature of association between entities. The deployment of an access control model for an enterprise environment is called a configuration. The configuration of an access control model for a given enterprise contains instances of model entities for that enterprise (e.g., role instances like Teller, Loan Officer for a commercial bank environment) and hence results in the Enterprise Authorization Specification. The safety of a configuration is defined as the state where the configuration does not violate enterprise access control/authorization policies. To verify the safety of the configuration therefore requires that the policies be expressed using access control model entities and relations. In other words there should not be any policy violations by the instances of the model entities and model relations for the enterprise. A common approach adopted to meet this requirement is to augment the access control model with expressions called constraints.
There are however many practical limitations in ensuring that the enterprise authorization specification is safe (does not violate policy constraints). The first one is the limitation of the underlying access control model. Since policies are specified using model entities and relations, it should be obvious to many practitioners that some access control models are more amenable for expression of complex enterprise policies than others. In general, higher the level of abstraction of model entities more is the policy definition capabilities of the model. Secondly, even if the underlying access control model does provide policy definition capabilities, the access control mechanism may not provide features for specification of all the different types of constraints needed to capture those policy requirements. The above two limitations point the need for an out-of-band approach (independent of access control mechanism and the underlying software platform) to represent enterprise authorization specification and validate it for satisfaction of enterprise policy constraints.
In this paper we provide one such approach. We have represented the enterprise authorization specification for a commercial bank enterprise in XML. The authorization specification is based on the role-based access control model (RBAC) [1] . The RBAC model itself is specified using XML Schema [4] . The RBAC XML Schema specification is then augmented with policy constraints using the Schematron constraint specification language [9] . The XML document containing the bank-enterprise authorization specification is then validated using the Schematron Validation Tool [12] .
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of the various components in our policy validation framework as well as the rationale for their choice. Section 3 describes the specification of the RBAC model using XML Schema language. Since RBAC model standards [10] provide taxonomy of models (as opposed to a single RBAC model) as well as well as choice of features to suit the enterprise environment, we will call our customized RBAC model for our bank environment as Bank-RBAC model. We will refer to the specification of Bank-RBAC model in XML Schema as Bank-RBAC XML Schema and the XML encoding of the bank-enterprise authorization specification based on the RBAC XML Schema as Bank-Authorization XML Data. Section 4 provides a sample encoding in XML of bank-enterprise authorization specification. Section 5 deals with constraints that could be specified using the XMLSchema language features. These cover all Bank-RBAC model's model-specific constraints as well as some rudimentary application-domain constraints. In section 6 we point out the limitations of the XML Schema features for specification of complex policy (domain-specific) constraints. We then illustrate the use of Schematron language for expressing those domain constraints within our Bank-RBAC XML Schema document with several examples. We briefly describe related work in section 7 and in section 8 we explain the scope for extending our current framework to enhance the capabilities of access control mechanism to enforce dynamic policy constraints.
Policy Validation Framework Components
A framework for programmatic or tool-based validation of enterprise authorization specification should have the following components:
(a) Choice of the underlying access control model and a language for its specification (b) A language for encoding enterprise authorization specification based on the access control model (c) A language for specifying policy requirements as constraints based on the access control model (d) A tool or API for programmatic validation of the enterprise authorization specification for conformance to model specifications and policy constraints.
Choice of Access Control model and its specification
of products such as Database Management Systems, Workflow systems and Enterprise Security Management systems [18] . A brief description of RBAC Models is as follows. The Role-based Access Control Model (RBAC) provides a generalized approach for representation of many types of access control policies (each describable only using a specific access control model) through the abstraction concept of roles. Many RBAC models have been proposed in the research literature [2] and the NIST RBAC standard provides taxonomy of RBAC models [10] . The RBAC reference model in the standard has four main entities -users, roles, privileges and sessions. Roles 
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Our motivation for choosing RBAC as the underlying access control model for the bank-enterprise authorization specification is that it is a sufficiently abstract model with configurations capable of expressing varied types of policies such as least privilege and separation of duties. RBAC has been widely implemented for different types
The Bank-RBAC model that we have chosen for illustration in our policy validation framework is based on the RBAC reference model described above but without the session entity and its two associated relations US and RS. We have excluded the session entity since session is a platform-dependent artifact. For example, a DBMS roles privileges PA UA users US RS Constraints Sessions session has a different set of parameters than a O/S login session like Telnet. We have also excluded the constraint from the model specification per se since constraint needs a different set of enforcement mechanisms than the simple set of cardinality and participation restrictions associated with binary relations. To summarize our Bank-RBAC model consists of users, roles and privileges as entities and the following relations -Role Inheritance (RH), userrole relation (UA) and privilege-role relation (PA).
Our language for Bank-RBAC model specification is XML Schema [4] since it provides constructs for specifying binary relations and hierarchical structures (the basic structural relationships of the RBAC model). XML Schema is one of the languages under the XML standard that is used for describing the structure of information within an XML document. Our choice of XML Schema over the other meta-data language DTD is due to the fact that XML Schema supports specification of cardinality and participation restrictions as well as rich data types (like enumerated data types). Further we need a means to augment the specification of the Bank-RBAC model with policy constraints. The XML Schema language enables this feature as well by allowing the embedding of constraints in other languages under a special "annotation" tag. We have made use of this feature by embedding our policy constraints specified using the Schematron language [9] within the XML-Schema representation of our Bank-enterprise RBAC model.
A Language for Encoding Enterprise Authorization Specifications
Our choice of XML Schema for Bank-RBAC model automatically provides XML as the choice for encoding enterprise authorization information. An advantage of encoding a structured information (such as bankenterprise authorization specification) in XML is that there are special types of software called XML Parsers that could be used to extract information from XML documents based on its associated structure (that is specified through XML Schema document). These XML Parsers are based on standard application programming interfaces such as Document Object Model (DOM) [5] . These parser libraries implemented in various procedural languages enable an application program written in the corresponding procedural language to create, maintain and retrieve XML encoded data. With an API for extracting information, a program could be written to properly interpret the contents of the validated enterprise authorization specification (encoded in XML), and map them to the native access control structures in the access control mechanisms present in heterogeneous application systems within the enterprise.
It is useful to point out at this stage that XML Parsers can also be used to validate an XML document for conformance to the structure specified in an associated XML Schema document. Hence in our case the BankAuthorization XML Data document can be validated for conformance to Bank-RBAC model specified through a XML Schema document. However as we pointed out earlier, XML Schemas can only be used for specifying data typing and cardinality constraints. These constraints are useful for properly specifying model entities and their associated binary relations. Hence XML Schemas can specify model-based constraints and therefore can be used to validate whether the Bank-Authorization XML data does indeed conform to the particular adaptation of the RBAC model for our banking enterprise (i.e., Bank-RBAC model).
A Language for specifying policy constraints
We already alluded to the fact that the XML Schema with its support for data types, cardinality and participation constraints can handle structural constraints and hence all model-based constraints (being structural in nature) can be expressed through XML Schema. However policy constraints pertain to the enterprise domain and hence involve the contents of enterprise authorization specification. More specifically they involve the model entity and relation instances found in the BankAuthorization XML Data. Further, studies have shown [6, 7] that the content-based policy constraints are much more complicated than model-based constraints since they may involve complex logical expressions or rules.
One approach that has been adopted to represent domain constraints is to annotate an XML Schema that has been used for representing a model for a domain, with ontological information regarding the domain using pattern based languages such as RDF [8] and Schematron [9] . In this paper we have annotated the XML Schema for Bank-RBAC Model with Schematron constraints that specify rules that that the access control data (in BankAuthorization XML Data) pertaining to the bank enterprise domain has to satisfy.
A Tool or API for Validation of Enterprise Authorization Specification
We have used a tool called the Schematron Validator for validating the bank-enterprise authorization specification (in Bank-Authorization XML Data) for conformance to policy constraints specified through the Schematron language. Since the Schematron Validator tool also validates an XML document for conformance to the referenced structure, it also automatically checks the XML encoded bank-enterprise authorization specification for conformance to the Bank-RBAC model specified through XML Schema. Hence using this tool we can validate the Bank-Authorization XML Data for satisfaction of both model-based as well as content-based (policy) constraints.
XML Schema specification of Bank-RBAC Model
The basic artifact for modeling any concept in XML Schema is the element. A name, type and a set of attributes can be specified for an XML Schema element. The type can be a simple data type like a 'string', or a complex data type. A complex data type in turn may involve additional elements. A data type can be an enumerated type (can only assume a value from a given set) as well. In addition a special data type called 'ID' is supported. This is often used as the data type for an attribute if that attribute uniquely identifies an instance of that element.
It is possible to specify certain structural constraints associated with an element. We can specify the maximum and minimum of times that element instance can occur in the XML document based on the XML Schema specification. We can also specify whether the use of an element or attribute is mandatory or optional.
As far as our Bank-RBAC model is concerned, all the entities (User, Role, Privileges) as well as relations (UserRole relation (UA), Role-Inheritance relation (RH) and Privilege-Role relation (PA)) are modeled as elements. Since these entities either contain multiple attributes (as in the case of elements representing User, Role and Privileges) or sub elements (as in the case of UA, RH and PA) relations, the data type associated is always a complex data type.
The specification of the User entity is as follows:
<xs:element name="user" type="userType"/> <xs:complexType name="userType"> <xs:attribute name="userID" type="xs:ID" use="required"/> <xs:attribute name="fullname" type="xs:string" use="optional"/> </xs:complexType >
The above definition of the data type 'userType' means that a user is represented as having two attributes 'userID' and 'fullname' with the former declared as a mandatory attribute and the latter declared as an optional attribute. Please note that the data type for 'userID' attribute is designated as 'xs:ID' which implies that the value for 'userID' attribute must be unique and hence no duplicates are allowed.
The entity 'Role' is specified as follows:
<xs:element name="role" type="roleType"/> <xs:complexType name="roleType"> <xs:attribute name="roleID" type="xs:ID" use="required"/> <xs:attribute name="rolename" type="validRole" use="required"/> <xs:attribute name="cardinality" type="roleLimit" use="optional"/> </xs:complexType> To complete our definition of role component, we need to define the data types "validRole" and "roleLimit". The data type definition of "validRole" lists the set of permissible role names in the bank enterprise while that for the "roleLimit" is used to specify a number that stands for the minimum and maximum number of users that can be assigned to that role. Observe that some of the elements specified above do not have the name attribute (like other element definitions we have seen before) but refers to the already defined elements through the value specified in the 'ref' attribute. The above XML Schema definition was verified to be syntactically correct using the XML Schema Validator tool -XML Spy [11].
use="required"/> <xs:attribute name="ToRole" type="validRole" use="required"/> </xs:complexType>
The Privilege-Role relation (PA) is specified in XML Schema as:
<xs:element name="RolePrivilegeAssignment" type="RPAType"/>
Encoding the enterprise authorization specification in XML
<xs:complexType name="RPAType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="privilege" type="xs:IDREF" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> Now that we have developed an XML Schema specification of the Bank-RBAC model, we now encode the enterprise authorization specification in an XML document whose tag structure should correspond to the element definitions in the XML Schema.
</xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="role" type="xs:IDREF" use="required"/> </xs:complexType>
We represent a sample set of users (by providing instances of the 'user' element in XML schema) as given below: The specification of a construct to specify conflicting roles for checking static separation of duty constraints is specified as:
<user userID="DrayJ" fullname="Jim Dray"/> <user userID="GranceT" fullname="Tim Grance"/> <xs:element name="ssd_roles" type="SSDType"/> <user userID="VincentH" fullname="Vincent Hu"/> <xs:complexType name="SSDType"> <xs:attribute name="SSD_ID" type="xs:ID" A sample set of encodings for role instances is: use="required"/> <xs:attribute name="BaseRole" type="validRole" <role roleID="BRM" rolename="BranchManager" use="required"/> cardinality="1"/> <xs:attribute name="ConflictRole" type="validRole" <role roleID="CSR" rolename="Customer_Service_Rep" use="required"/> cardinality="3"/> </xs:complexType> <role roleID="SDV" rolename="SD_Vault_Officer" cardinality="2"/> Finally the fact that the entire Bank-RBAC model is made of entities User, Role, Privilege and UA, RH and PA relations is specified in the XML Schema by creating a root element called 'BANK_RBAC_Model' with elements representing the entities and relations as subelements.
A sample set of privileges are given below:
<privilege privID="OPEN_ACCT" resource="DepAcct" oper="Open"/> <privilege privID="DEBIT_ACCT" resource="DepAcct" oper="Debit"/> Let us now review the structural constraints (modelbased) and some rudimentary domain-specific policy constraints that we have been able to specify in our Bank-RBAC XML Schema. (Please note that here we include only constraints that can be validated by an XML Schema parser). 
Domain Constraints represented using the XML Schema
ToRole="BranchManager"/> A sample set of encodings for Role-Privilege relations is: (a) The role names that occur in BankAuthorization XML Data should be one of the valid names from the list specified in the XML Schema (through the validRole data type). We have seen that the only domain-specific policy constraint that XML Schema can specify is the list of valid names for Bank-RBAC model entity instances through the enumeration data type. No other contentbased policy constraint can be specified using XML Schema. For specifying these types of constraints we use the Schematron language. In this section we illustrate with several examples the specification of policy constraints using Schematron.
<privilege>DEBIT_LOAN</privilege> <privilege>CREDIT_LOAN</privilege> </RolePrivilegeAssignment>
A sample set of encoding for specifying conflicting roles is:
In a schematron constraint definition, constraints are defined using the following tags:
ConflictRole="Accounting_Manager"/> <ssd_roles SSD_ID="SSD3" BaseRole="Internal_Auditor" (a) a 'rule' tag to define the context (in terms of the XML schema element) for the constraint and With the above primer on Schematron, we now illustrate the specification of some important policy constraints that govern the access control requirements for the bank enterprise environment.
The actual data in our Bank-Authorization XML Data file is:
Constraint 1: (Role Cardinality Constraint) The cardinality limit (the maximum number of users that can be assigned) specified in the role definition for a role should not be violated in the actual user assignments for that role.
</UserRoleAssignment>
The schematron validator therefore generated the following error message:
From pattern "Checking for Role Cardinality":
The role definition for the Branch Manager role(roleID = 'BRM') in our XML encoded access control data file is as follows: The assertion to be made in this context is that in the corresponding User-Role relation (where the @role='BRM'), the count of the number of users should not exceed the number specified through the cardinality attribute (@cardinality = 1). The assertion and the corresponding diagnostic messages expressed in schematron through the assert and diagnostic tags respectively are given below: The diagnostic message due to our authorization specification not conforming to the above constraint is: Constraint 4: (Constraint specifying Conflicting Users): Users John Wack (user/text() ='JohnW') and Susan Wack (user/text() = 'SusanW') should not be assigned to the same role (whatever be the role) since they have spousal relationship.
From pattern "Checking for Dependent Role Assignments":
Assertion fails: "A user assigned to SDV must already be assigned to CSR role" at /Bank_RBAC_Model [1] /UserRoleAssignment [3] /user [2] The schematron description of the above constraint is: The specification of the constraint that a particular user Tom (user/text()= 'TomK') should not be assigned more than two roles is:. 
Scope for Further Work
We have provided a framework for validation of an enterprise authorization specification. The platform and language independent nature of the framework makes it an ideal candidate for incorporating this into the security data and policy specification module of enterprise security administration tools. With the availability of standardized API (e.g., DOM) based XML parsers, authorization specification data can be easily be mapped to the native formats required of various platform-specific access control mechanisms as is done in a class of tools called provisioning tools [18] .
However, our constraint specification framework is not without its limitations. For example, it is not possible to formulate constraints that involve nested processing of data in two sets (e.g., verify consistency of privilege assignments for each pair of SSD roles). This limitation could be seen in the formulation of Constraint 4, where we had to identify the specific pair of conflicting users instead of formulating the constraint using a generalized list of all conflicted users. Further our constraint specification framework contains only static constraints but not dynamic constraints that make use of contextual information like time, location, process state etc. to enforce access restriction at run time. We are exploring the possibility of specifying such constraints through XSLT templates and then use XLST processors with various language bindings to automatically generate code in procedural languages like Java and C++ so as to incorporate them in the access enforcement module of the access control mechanism of target platforms.
